The recent visit by Iran’s Hassan Rouhani to Russia has once again underscored how essential both countries remain for each other in the Syria war that is still far from a decisive end. To that extent, both countries are strategically co-operating. The need, however, is to elevate this strategic co-operation to a strategic alliance against the dark forces of terrorism and extremism that continue to receive sponsorship from ‘rouge elements’ in the West and the Arab world and that are bent upon destabilizing the region from the west to central and south-east Asia, encompassing Iran, Russia and China and their allies as well. To that extent, Iran-Russia strategic alliance appears to be the centre piece of the anti-terror nexus in the wet Asia. But challenges remain as well.
That is to say, while their bi-lateral relations have been overshadowed by the Syrian crisis, it is the same crisis that have dawned upon them the need to extend that alliance against a threat that is not going to die out any time soon. Hence, the emphasis on extending this co-operation to Afghanistan where Iran can facilitate Russian access to the Taliban to counter the rising threat of ISIS. Therefore, for the West, breaking that alliance carries a lot of significance. Hence, the US demand to ‘free’ Syria of the Iranian elements in order to pave the way for a political settlement.
The visit, in this context, has sent a clear cut message to the West about the way Russia continues to see Iran’s role in Syria and in stabilizing global oil market. For Iran itself, Russia remains the most important ally against the West and the ‘Sunni’ Arab world. Hence, Iran’s own emphasis on extending co-operation with Russia.
The emphasis on co-operation did gain renewed significance few days ago when Israeli jets hit targets in Syria associated with Hezbollah, and Assad’s forces launched air-defense missiles.
Shortly afterward, the Israeli ambassador to Moscow was summoned by the Russian government over the incident. Therefore, Moscow’s partnership with the Islamic Republic, Assad and Hezbollah started getting adversely affected by Russia’s relationship with Israel.
Realizing this, Iran decided to slightly modify terms of its co-operation with Russia. As such, just ahead of the talks between Putin and Rouhani, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif announced that Russia would be able to use Iranian military bases for air strikes in Syria on a “case-by-case basis.” Russia used Hamadan Airbase in Iran to launch attacks last year against militants in Syria.
Therefore, given the sensitivity of the scenario prevailing in the region, it was high time for Rouhani to make his first official visit to Moscow, although both leaders have previously met nine times on non-bi-lateral platforms.
Iran is clearly keen to enhance its co-operation with Russia in Syria, and this particular meeting has come at a time when Iran has already become an official guarantor of cease-fire in Syria. After the recent round of Syria talks in Kazakhstan on March 15, Russia’s envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev said that Iran had signed a document to this effect. Four days later, Iran sent an official note to the UN Security Council requesting that its status as one of the three guarantors of the cease-fire be recognized.
While there had been suspicions in Iran regarding Russia’s long-term plans for Syria, the move has ushered in a new and more solid phase of the Iran-Russia partnership, and in this vein, Rouhani’s visit is likely to help the two countries devise a commonly agreed road map for their future steps in Syria. There are, however, blocks and challenges that Iran has to overcome.
For Iran, it is imperative to have a broader agreement on Syria with Russia given that the nature of Russia’s position in Syria is markedly different from that of Iran. For instance, while Russia sees benefit in having Turkey on board with regard to Syrian settlement, Iran has not been comfortable with Turkey’s presence as one of the guarantors.
This is a complex issue. Out of the five years of war in Syria, Turkish backed Syrian “rebels” have fought against Assad and Iran-backed groups have fought to resist Turkish backed militias and protected Assad. While Turkey’s about-turn might have reduced some of the tension, differences between both countries remain unresolved and, therefore, the sources of strategic-anxiety.
Therefore, while Russia may want to maintain a balance between Turkey and Iran, Iran expects a slight tilt to ward off threats of isolation in the region.
Similarly, while Iran is of central position to Russia’s presence in Syria, Tehran is weary of Russia normalizing its relations with Trump and use Iran’s position in the region as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the West to make them lift economic sanctions imposed in the wake of Crimea crisis.
Similar sort of sensitivity exists in Iran with regard to Russia’s relations with Iran’s arch rival, Israel.
Therefore, the important question for Iran is that of transforming strategic co-operation with Russia into a strategic alliance as a means to deal with these sensitivities. This is something that requires the ability to steer their bi-lateral relations on the course that sees minimum of third party influence.
Rouhani’s visit, therefore, came at a time when the need for clearly understanding Iran’s interest in the region is high. With Iran going into presidential elections on May 19, the incumbent administration would also certainly want to use and present its strong position in Syria as a political win—something that Iran cannot achieve without full Russian support.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.
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