Some aspects of two recent forums (the Second Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) held in Vladivostok and the G20 Summit hosted by Hangzhou) created fertile ground for a discussion concerning a range of problems inherent in the “Sino-Russo-Japanese” tripartite relations.
Over time, the relevance of the discussion will only be increasing, especially if the future president of the leading global power opts to change the country’s foreign policy in view of the growing discontent of Americans with the engagement of their country in global political games, especially those involving regions located thousands of kilometers away from the US.
Thus, the status of the “Russo-Sino-Japanese” tripartite relations will have an increasing importance, at least for the situation in the northern part of the marine area, stretching southwards from the Korean Peninsula to the Strait of Malacca.
Today, the state of affairs in this area has the same significance for the world order as once the “Balkans” had. Thus, it is important for Russia to ensure it has a clear understanding of the processes unrolling in this region. Especially since Russia is compelled to make an “eastward shift” in its foreign policy due to some objective reasons.
Speaking at the EEF plenary session, South Korean President Park Geun-hye termed the principle controversy of the situation evolving around the modern “Balkans“ as “the Asian paradox“.
This term has been used in the recent years to describe a phenomenon, in which two countries, in their interstate relations, (one of them often, but not always, being China) demonstrate conflicting economic and political aspirations.
Political ambitions seem to have become a major stumbling stone on the Asian continent impeding the implementation of mutually beneficial multilateral projects. In particular, political obstacles hinder practical implementation of the pompous appeals to revive the Silk Road.
“The Asian paradox” manifests itself to the fullest in the “Sino-Japanese” duo of the “Russia-China-Japan” triangle. It seems that even the parties to this “duo” themselves would find it challenging providing somewhat sensible reasoning as to why two leading Asian powers are unable to reconcile (and, preferably, in a less confrontational manner) their interests emerging as the two are rising to the ranks of new leading political players. This question, however, seem to be no longer relevant.
There is another, much more important for Russia aspect: both China and Japan are gaining a competitive edge on the world stage, and not only in the northern area of the mentioned region, but also in the southern one, as well as in the Indian Ocean, Africa, Latin America and Europe. The worst part of this already pessimistic scenario is that it does not seem to offer room for improvement.
In previous NEO’s articles it was noted that the conduct of the Japanese and Chinese leaders at G20 would be prophetic. An answer to the question of whether Japanese PM Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping would meet in the course of the Summit, and if so, in what format, remained a mystery until the opening of G20.
Then some anonymous source from the Japanese government leaked information that a meeting would be held immediately after the closing of the Summit and that the leaders would meet in a formal setting.
However, PM Abe’s statement he made right before his trip to Beijing where he, “expressing Japan’s stance on the situation in the East China Sea and the South China Sea,” stressed the importance of compliance with the international law to ensure freedom of navigation, made some skeptical as to the possibility of a meeting of the two leaders.
One could not but take notice that Mr. Abe’s (rather innocent) remark was suggestive in nature. First, it implied that Tokyo had not had it in plans to discuss with Beijing the status of Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, and secondly, that Japan approved of the July 10 resolution pertaining to the situation in the South China Sea adopted by the Hague Arbitration Court. This resolution has been the source of nearly all most serious China’s foreign policy troubles in the recent years.
But despite everything, the heads of the two leading Asian powers had brief talks for the first time in one and a half years. And the significance of the meeting is not in the exchange of clichés about the necessity to establish “long-term, healthy and stable” bilateral relations, which had been heard at a regular APEC summit hosted by Beijing two years earlier, but in the very fact that it actually took place.
Whether this meeting will signify the beginning of a thaw in the Sino-Japanese relations will be clear only after the tripartite summit (supposedly) scheduled for the coming December. Finalization of the many-year process of “marking time”, in which three countries Japan, South Korea and China failed to strike a free trade deal, is expected to become the summit’s basic theme.
This project has been affected by political ambitions in the most obvious and negative way. To make matters worse, in the recent months another grave problem was added to the “collection” of Japanese-South Korean “tender spots” when the deployment of the American Missile Defense System (THAAD) had been launched in South Korea. When meeting with Park Geun-hye in the course of G20, Xi Jinping explicitly voiced China’s concern over this issue.
But no matter how the relations in the Sino-Chinese “edge” of the “Russia-China-Japan” triangle develop in the future, it is obvious that the two leading Asian powers (and Russia’s VIP neighbors) will continue competing on the global political scene.
Since Russia will be inevitably affected by the ups and downs of this “competition”, it needs to keep cool head and, first, account for it when building its foreign policy, and, secondly, take steps to mitigate its negative impact on the country’s foreign policy and the program of Siberia and the Far East economic development.
What’s more, when implementing its strategy in relation to these Asian countries, Russia should, first, minimize the consequences of the (seemingly inevitable) spread of Sino-Japanese problems to the Russian territory, and, secondly, not to take any voluntary or involuntarily actions that could further aggravate the situation.
To achieve its objectives, Russia would have to measure twice, cut once when dealing with either China or Japan. This tactic would be especially handy when resolving the proverbial “problem of the Kuril Islands” or the problem of “the Northern Territories” as Japanese refer to it.
Vladimir Terekhov, Expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.“
