Continuing on:Part 1: Speaking of chemical weapons.... What about Israel's arsenal?Part 2: What about Israel's chemical weapons? Israel :Be sure to check out the little interactive map!Excerpts below-Premise:
Analysts believe that Israel likely initiated a chemical warfare (CW) program at some point between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s. [1] Intelligence sources have also suggested that Israel has previously developed, tested, produced, and possibly even deployed CW munitions.
Capabilities:
Israel maintains advanced national scientific-technical CW research and development (R&D) infrastructure, in addition to well-respected academic and industrial chemistry communities. Israel openly publishes defensive CW research, but does not officially comment on its CW capabilities or policies. [10] According to the Swedish Defence Research Agency, Israel at some point had an advanced CW program capable of producing nerve agents, mustard gas, riot-control, and even "binary" nerve agents (agents comprised of two relatively harmless substances that become toxic when mixed in the field).[11]Speculation about the dual-capable nature of Israeli chemistry and toxic chemicals research focuses on the Israel Institute for Biological Research (IIBR), a highly classified research center operated and funded by the Israel Ministry of Defense (MOD). [18] Karel Knip's 1999 survey of IIBR's publications reveals an overall "extensive effort to identify practical methods of synthesis for nerve gases (such as tabun, sarin, and VX) and other organophosphorous and fluorine compounds." [19] IIBR continues to publish defensive CW research openly, as do several other Israeli institutions, including Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, and the Weizmann Institute of Science. [20] Several prominent foreign institutions have collaborated on and co-authored defensive CW agent research with Israelis. [21]
A review of patent records illustrates ongoing Israeli commitment to biodefense research. Israeli scientists at the IIBR have conducted research into skin applications such as a decontaminating "gel" to neutralize chemical and biological agents. [22] Other Israeli research has led to European patents for similar technologies designed to prevent the absorption of substances ranging from the oil found in poison ivy to VX. [23] A series of recent Israeli patents concerns research into pesticide/nerve agent antidotes and treatments post-exposure. [24]
Strategic and Operational Aspects of Israel's CW Capabilities
Bibliographical surveys can indicate the general sophistication level of physical infrastructure and expertise. However, assessing strategy or operational status requires additional information. The Israeli government does not comment on speculation about its domestic CW program; declassified U.S. intelligence assessments that mention Israel also edit out their actual Israeli CW assessments. [25] A 1983 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report, however, revealed that Israel maintained a CW testing facility in the Negev desert. [26] Additionally, the Sunday Times in 1998 cited an Israeli military source in reporting that Israeli F-16 crews received training in loading active chemical and biological warheads onto airplanes; this suggests Israel's intent to maintain both chemical agents and a delivery system.
The unratified chemical weapons treaty
In 1992, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) introduced new questions for Israeli policy. The CWC allowance of short-notice challenge inspections of any member-state facility could threaten the "off-limits" status of Israel's Dimona nuclear facility. [58] Nevertheless, several factors likely encouraged Israeli leaders to sign the treaty. First, the 1991 Madrid Conference and the initiation of the Middle East peace process reconfigured Israel's security outlook. As a consequence "Israel began to reconsider its policy on arms control," and began better understanding and developing its outlook towards multilateral arms control and multilateral negotiations. [59] Second, the recent war with Iraq heightened Israeli sensitivity to chemical weapons proliferation as a security threat. [60] According to Gerald Steinberg, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin considered the CWC a "net benefit," despite the Arab League's plan to boycott the treaty to protest Israel's nuclear policies. [61] Cohen also notes that the Rabin government recognized that signing the treaty, while symbolically important, did not finalize Israel's commitment until and unless Israel also ratified the treaty. [62] Israel signed the CWC on 13 January 1993, the first day it was opened for signature, alongside 65 other countries, including Iran and 5 Arab League countries that abandoned the boycott. [63] By the end of the year, a total of 13 Arab League countries had signed the CWC. At the Signing Ceremony of the CWC, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres issued a rare official Israeli statement on CW, and emphasized that while Israel fully accepted the spirit of the CWC, it would continue to seek greater regional acceptance of the treaty. [64] During the CWC Preparatory Commission, Israeli diplomats participated in talks to clarify and refine how the CWC's verification procedures would operate on site, in addition to the procedures surrounding challenge inspections and the issue of "managed access" to prevent potential abuse of these tools by requesting unsuitable challenge inspections. [65]
Israel has not ratified the CWC despite its entry into force in 1997. When the ratification issue surfaced in April 1997, a high-level ad hoc ministerial committee headed by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and including Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, Commerce Minister Natan Sharansky, and National Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon re-examined Israel's CWC position. [66] The committee quietly decided not to submit the CWC to the Israeli parliament for ratification
1997 to the Present: Ongoing Secrecy and Suspicion
In 1993, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment identified Israel as a probable host to an offensive CW capability. [68] Israel's established scientific community and chemical industry, alongside continued secrecy about the IIBR facility, continue to fuel speculation. A number of well-publicized events in the 1990s brought further attention to this issue. In 1997, Israeli security agents reportedly attempted to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Meshal using levofentanyl, possibly a modified form of the opioid, fentanyl. [69] In 1998, Dutch authorities publically confirmed that the 1992 El Al cargo plane that crashed in Amsterdam en route to Israel carried 190 liters of dimethyl methylphosphonate. [70] Media reports alleged that the Israelis intended to use it for the manufacture of sarin, and that the amount carried on board could have yielded up to 594 pounds of the nerve agent. [71] However, Israeli officials argued that the IIBR ordered the chemicals for defensive research, and that the U.S. government had approved the shipment. [72] In addition to its industrial applications and utility as a precursor in sarin production, dimethyl methylphosphonate can be used as a simulant for testing the effectiveness of filters in chemical protective equipment. [73]In the same year, an Israeli military source reported that Israeli F-16 crews received training in loading active chemical and biological warheads onto airplanes, suggesting active stockpiles at military installations, viable CW delivery capabilities, and a continued active role for CW in Israel's military planning. [74]
Etc., read the rest at your leisure at the link provided
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