EU-China: on the Prospects for the Development of Bilateral Relations

Several important developments in recent weeks give reason to continue assessing the nature of the development of relations between China and the EU, constituting the leaders of the global political arena.
The main issues center around the Brexit referendum held on June 23 (whether or not the UK shall stay within the EU), followed by the 18th bilateral summit between the EU and China which was held in Beijing from July 12 to 13, and lastly, the European Commission meeting held on July 20.
In China, all the attention was riveted to the then upcoming date of the British referendum, fearing adverse consequences to the EU should one of its leading members step out from the Union.
Inasmuch as in recent times, the EU has been viewed in Beijing not only as China’s most important economic partner, but also as a potential counterweight to the United States in the escalating US-China global political game.
During the bilateral summit, one of the main goals of the Chinese leadership was to obtain ‘first hand’ information about the state of affairs in the Union after the Brexit. And, as follows from the speech delivered by the Chinese Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, China reacted “with confidence” to the words of the European leaders guaranteeing the “strength” of the EU after the Brexit 
The trip to Beijing by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, was especially made to coincide with the 11th Asia-Europe Meeting, ASEM, which was this time held in Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia.
However, it would seem that the main purpose for this foreign tour by the EU leadership was rather to carry out negotiations with the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, and not the routine presence on one of the many ‘high’ international forums where rivalry in political rhetoric is the order of the day and declarative documents, irrelevant in practical terms, are accepted.
In Beijing, the EU leaders also discussed the specifics of the complex relationship with the second world power, which is also the EU’s second (after the US) trade partner. Almost certainly, the PRC leadership were assured that there was no reason to worry about the Brexit, and that bilateral relations would continue developing successfully.
The foreign policy background of the EU-China summit contributed to the development of past and upcoming events, such as the events of late June during the ‘Big Seven’ summit in Japan, the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague on July 12 (at the request of the Philippines on the legality of China’s claims to the ownership of 80%-90% of the waters of the South China Sea) and the G-20 summit to be held in Beijing in September 2016.
The behaviour of the EU leadership against this background hardly confirms the popular belief of complete dependence on the United States for European foreign policy. This conclusion is mainly based on Europe’s support of the US’ anti-Russian actions in recent times. Nevertheless, the fact of such support can be more correctly viewed rather as substantial evidence, in this case, of the coincidence of the interests of the USA and the leading Europeans, primarily Germany.
The other discrepancies (increasingly visible) appearing between them concern China. The European counterparts clearly do not wish to be integrated into a policy of containment of US main foreign opponent. Brussels’ relations with China are experiencing problems in the sphere of bilateral economic relations, but there are no visible significant barriers of political nature.
US-EU differences emerged, in particularly, in the vague wording of the last G-7 Summit Declaration, which touched on the situation in the South-China sea, where there is currently a direct (including military) US-China confrontation.
China also agreed with the statement of the need to respect international law in the resolution of territorial disputes, and to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The whole issue, then, centers on what to include in international legal institutions.
For that, Beijing categorically refuses to accept the above-mentioned decision by the PCA, which rejects the existence of any arguments on the “historic” plan of China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. According to experts, the next Sino-European summit was ‘shadowed’ by this decision.
Senior EU officials were faced with the problem of deciding whether they would support this decision by the PCA, while at the same time avoiding sabotaging a 30-year process of developing mutually beneficial relations with the second world power.
It is difficult to judge how the debate with the Chinese leaders went behind closed doors, but, judging by the public ‘remarks’ by Donald Tusk ), this issue was apparently resolved (as well as at G-7 summit) by using the wording of the general plan itself, that is, without reference to neither the specifics of the situation in the South-China Sea, nor the PCA verdict.
According to separate remarks by Donald Tusk, the bilateral economic relations have been somewhat marred by several problems. The major source of conflict has proven to be the Chinese economy, which prompted the Chinese leadership in early 2016 to take a series of radical and long-term measures aimed at restructuring it. In this case, from all appearances, the recommendations of the EU experts were taken into account.
This year, the most pressing issue in the bilateral relations is the granting of a “market economy” status to China by the Europeans. In January this year, the EU panel decided “to wait until the end of the year” for the determination of its own position on the issue, and to hold its intermediate discussion “during the second half of 2016.”
According to the Financial Times of July 20, the EU draft solution prepared on this day would grant Beijing the said status after implementing the “American-European” requirements to reduce Chinese steel exports to the world markets, and after abandoning its price dumping policy. Since the beginning of this year, these requirements have taken an almost central place in China’s economic relations with the leading Western countries.
In general, we can say the current EU-China relations are of transitional nature. Several key factors will determine in which direction they will continue to develop.
These include the transformation of the global political map in general and, in particular, in its most “heated” zones, primarily concerning the South China Sea issue. A change in the domestic political strategy which is now evident in Europe, China and the United States, plays the most significant role.
The presence and participation of these powers on all platforms where EU-China negotiations are conducted seems to be certainly invisible (but carrying a lot of weight). This is particularly illustrated by the above-mentioned decision of the EU on the issue concerning the status of the Chinese economy.
Once again, it must be emphasized that the latter does not in any way indicate a lack of independence in Europe. In this case as well, the issue is simply that the interests of “both sides of the Atlantic” continue (still) to be in sync.
Of particular importance to the relations between Beijing and Brussels is the question of success of the economic reforms currently underway in China, which shall also determine the perspective solutions to the proverbial “overproduction of steel” problem.
In any case, it is most apt to pay special attention to the trends in China’s relations with the EU as a whole, as well as with leading members of the Union, and the United Kingdom. This has now become one of the central points of contention on the new global political arena.
Vladimir Terekhov, an expert on the problems of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.