The interest that has been generated by the author’s articles on the scandals around the Yasukuni shrine and other articles on our web-site on the “comfort women” problem has encouraged the author to take a closer look at the inception of much of the hard-core anti-Japanese trend in the ideology of the Republic of Korea.
Japan’s role in the Korean ideological model is more complex than it may seem. On the one hand, Japan is considered the main culprit and source of all misfortunes, both in the North and in the South, and not without reason. On the other hand, the most important steps towards modernization were related to the Japanese, one way or another, even though they were accompanied by a policy that was aimed at dissolving Korean national identity.
The situation is aggravated by the “unsecured victory” syndrome, which should be explained. Victory, especially over the colonialists, presupposes two important aspects. First, liberation means not only the withdrawal and defeat of the invaders, but the abolition of all entities established by them, as well as punishing their supporters who contributed to the oppression. Second, victory suggests that the local forces actively play the decisive, or at least important, role in the country’s liberation. However, Korea’s liberation was not at the merit of the Koreans. Even the Korean armed units that were preparing to take part in the war against Japan under their own flag did not have time to do it, and deserve victory in the eyes of the nation. If Kim Il Sung was at least presented and glorified as the legendary guerrilla commander in the North, the political landscape in the Southern part of the peninsula was different. The South took no complex measures to liquidate the colonial heritage, which could be compared with the denazification of Germany.
The new South Korean authorities promised to punish national betrayers from time to time. The first President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, who was a firebrand nationalist and anti-Japan devotee, tried to do this. A special committee was established for purging, but it turned out that there was no one to replace the purged. Most security officials accounted for pro-Japanese members and collaborationists, thus undermining the campaign, and the final purging would change the power balance in favour of the left-wingers, which was unacceptable for Rhee. As a result, the campaign was suspended, having affected only those politicians who were dangerous for Rhee’s political aspirations.
However, Syngman Rhee’s anti-Japan policy was a part of a state ideology at least equal to anti-communism. In fact, even now, it is difficult to find pro-Japanese circles in Korea if they presuppose pro-Japanese sentiments in the conventional sense: the declared commitment to Japan as a model, the glorification of Japanese policy and culture, the justification of Japan’s actions in Korea on this or that pretext. Anyone demonstrating an “insufficiently enthusiastic way of thinking” was marked down as a pro-Japanese member.
Meanwhile, elements on the Japanese path of development have been actively incorporated since the time of Park Chung-hee. This covers both the industrial organization and the education system, and some elements of the ideology. In addition, having opposed the public opinion of the 1960s, Park did something that brought the country a lot of political and economic benefits from the strategic point of view. In 1965, he established diplomatic relations with Japan. Korea got an opportunity to manoeuver between the United States and Japan; the Japanese compensations for the past colonial heritage and investments in the Korean markets became one of the important reasons for the Korean economic miracle.
However, there was no public indulgence in the anti-Japan ideological policy under Park. Park was generally a fan of Japanese music. Nevertheless, it was officially prohibited. Seoul completely disapproved all things related to Japan, regardless of the person in power: imported cars, equipment, literature, music, motion pictures (though it bought licenses for Japanese equipment). They fought fashion wise by copying, and Japanese films were shown in the Republic of Korea only in 1996. In some cases, after a popular film appeared on the screen in Japan, Korea filmed the same movie with a slightly different plot and involving Korean actors (for example, something like this happened to the Japanese film – The Ring.)
However, the subject of Japan’s responsibility for the crimes of the first half of the 20th century remains. Some current problems, for example the lack of democracy, are attributed to the colonial heritage. The Japanese are imputed even with the ritual extermination of all tigers on the peninsula, or driving piles in the geomantic active sites to break the Korean national spirit. Such myth-making reaches the point of ridicule. However, some practices look like a purposeful nurturing of hatred. In this context, one can note that many South Korean museums exhibit dioramas with many naturalistic details demonstrating the torture of Korean patriots, usually beautiful young women, by the Japanese,. These dioramas are often visited by schoolchildren, including small children.
As a result, a Korean scientist saying something positive about Japan’s influence on Korea in colonial times was equivalent to academic or political suicide, and the charge of pro-Japanism in the lexicon of the Korean nationalists is the second most significant after accusations of being sympathetic to communism and the DPRK. Thus, while making an anti-Russian statement, a well-known political expert by the name of Han Sung Cho has noted, “Japan’s victory in the Russian-Japanese War was better for Korea. If Korea happened to fall under Russia’s zone of influence after the Revolution of 1917, it might have been communized, and we would have lived like the North Koreans.” Han wanted to say that Japan was better for Korea than Russia, but the public heard “Japan was better” and felt insulted. After this, the earlier-respected professor was dismissed, and angry and abusive comments showered his blog and mail.
Moon Chang Gyk, a politician, who was nominated as the Prime Minister by Park Geun-hye, has faced almost the same situation. As soon as it became known that in 2007 he called Japan’s colonization “God-given gift for Korea,” this was a good reason for the protest campaign due to which he withdrew his candidacy.
The same concerns the story of Kim Ki-jong, who wounded the face of the U.S. Ambassador in early 2015. Earlier, this nationalist had attacked the Japanese Ambassador by throwing two pieces of concrete at him. Despite the fact that this was the first attack on a diplomat of such a rank, it was against the background of another round of acute controversy over the Dokdo isle, and Kim was put on probation and kept his connections to the government offices by leading the organization that was responsible for clarifying Japanese crimes for the youth. Apparently, this led to him thinking that the attack on the US Ambassador would not result in serious consequences.
Any event that somehow relates to Japan’s unwillingness to bend under Korea’s narrative is immediately broadcast and exaggerated. And even if a compromise is found in respect of some acute issue, from the perspective of public opinion, either the Japanese are still not loud enough in their penitence, or the authorities made a deal that ignored the real demands of the masses.
Meanwhile, Japan has a different attitude towards history and historical claims. First, they have their own insight in many events that is naturally different from that of the Koreans. Second, they have turned over the pages of the past long ago. It is believed that Japan has already paid for everything, and its crimes are redeemed both by apologies and compensations, and the atomic bombings. Therefore, there is no need for constant apologies: what is done is done. It is enough to play the blame game for the crimes of our grandfathers. Of course, such a behaviour by Japan inflames the anti-Japanese myth.
In conclusion, having failed to secure a well-deserved victory over Japan and its supporters, the Korean national myth tries to compensate for it by realizing nationalist complexes. Although the author agrees with the Koreans that revisionism is unacceptable, other actions taken by Korean nationalists resembling patterns common in post-Soviet Russia do not excite any sympathy.
Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
