By Gregory Wilpert and Alberto Acosta
An interview with Ecuadorian intellectual Alberto Acosta. He is a former minister of Energy, former president of Ecuador's Constituent Assembly of 2008, and a former presidential candidate for a coalition of leftist parties in 2013. The interview below was conducted the day before the February 4th referendum, in which the government presented seven questions to the population, on whether politicians who are convicted for corruption should be allowed to ever hold office again, whether penalties for sexual child abuse should be toughened, whether mineral mining should be restricted in Ecuador, whether a land speculation tax should be lifted, whether reelection of public office should be limited, and whether the protected area of the Yasuni national park should be expanded. All seven questions were approved with an average two-thirds majority voting in favor.
Gregory Wilpert: How do you see the conflict between Correa and Moreno? Is it a left-right conflict or is it something more complicated that has other dividing lines?
Alberto Acosta: It seems to me that the conflict that we are going through in Ecuador at the moment has nothing to do with a conflict between left and right. In no way can we find this discussion within Correa-ism and Moreno-ism or in the conflict between Moreno-ism and Correa-ism. The main point of conflict is that the current president Lenin Moreno turned out not to be a puppet of Correa's, as we all thought. He himself had presented himself as a follower of the poorly named "Citizens' Revolution" and during the campaign he repeatedly said he would deepen this Citizens' Revolution. But, when he got to the presidency he surprised everyone. He was not a puppet. He liberated himself from his mentor, just like Pinocchio, who liberated himself from Gepetto. He will not return to Gepetto.
So what we see now is a Moreno who liberates himself from his godfather, who was Correa, and Correa who is furious that Moreno liberated himself. So there is a confrontation between these two personalities, apparently. Behind this, no doubt, there are interests, deep interests, that are determined to weaken the influence of Correa and that Moreno be the spokesperson for those interests. They were beneficiaries of the Correa government. That's another interesting point to take into account: Correa raised the banner of revolution and of socialism, but he didn't practice either of these by any means. He ended up being a great modernizer of capitalism.
It's true that poverty was reduced, until the year 2014, but during the entire government of Correa the big economic groups gain a lot more. One could say that there is an effect of the lizard. That is, when the lizard opens its mouth, the lower jaw goes down and the upper jaw goes up. Poverty went down, but wealth concentration went up - because there was a lot of money. It was easy to distribute this money thanks to the abundant export of oil and then came the foreign indebtedness. This is the point of departure. And now these two groups are confronting each other within the same movement, and we cannot fall into the traditional analysis of left-right, because Correa was not a leftist and neither is Moreno.
GW: One of the criticisms that Correa has of Moreno is that Moreno is turning more and more towards the right in terms of economic policies. What do you make of this criticism?
AA: This is completely false. Moreno, in his economic management, has not changed anything, in relation to Correa. It is the same inertia. Let's not forget that with Correa, in the year 2014 Ecuador already returned to the International Monetary Fund and in 2015 signed a free trade agreement with the European Union - in the same terms that neoliberal governments of Colombia and Peru signed these agreements with neoliberal Europe. There is no difference. And what has Moreno done in these past months, almost eight months of government? He has maintained the financing of the government, exactly the same way as Correa, by turning to external indebtedness. The big question is, what will Moreno do following February 5th [after the referendum] That's the big question. There's a big unknown.
He has several options. I can identify three. The first is to return completely to the corner of the International Monetary Fund and to the logic of neoliberalism. There are groups that are pushing for that. The other is to continue with this type of management, which can continue a while longer, but which could end very badly, of financing the economy with foreign indebtedness, liberating it from more expensive debt, with cheaper debt, or wait until the price of oil rises, which is a risky bet. That's what Correa did and Moreno could continue with that. And a third path would be to follow a heterodox adjustment. That is, to tax those who have more, who earn more, and to not hit the popular sectors - this would be in synchronized with the constitution of Montecristi [of 2008].
You shouldn't forget one thing that seems key to me, to understand what is happening. These months of the Moreno government, which is to a large extent a part of the Correa government, has been characterized by short-term economic management. The economy is politics - this we already know. Technocratic economic management without politics is a big lie. It's a fallacy. But in electoral periods, the economy is more subordinated to politics, to a short term politics. This is known. As the political cycle of the economy. But this political cycle of the economy will end after the political consultation [on February 4th]. Or, it will be less powerful following the consultation. So that's when the moment of truth comes of the Moreno government. Moreno has made an enormous effort in the first months to have his own personality and to liberate himself from the influence of Correa. Those are points in favor of Moreno because he has achieved this to a large extent. He is hoping for backing from the popular consultation. And now comes the moment of truth, particularly in the economic realm. He can go towards the neoliberal side, choose to continue as before, or look for a solution that is more heterodox progressive, or even revolutionary, as it would be if the constitution of Monetcristi were to be applied.
GW: Why, then, is this referendum so important?
AA: The Referendum is very very important for Moreno, because this is what will legitimate him. He first appeared as Correa's candidate. He appeared as Correa's successor. He was supposed to work and function as Correa's puppet. But now he wants the support of a far broader sector. He won the vote by a very narrow margin, with claims of fraud. I don't know if there was fraud, but the results were very close for a government, for the party, for a political tendency that has had quite a few successes in the past ten years.
GW: Let's take a look now at the referendum questions. One key referendum question has to do with the Council of Citizen Participation and its reform. What do you think of the question and what is the degree of importance of reforming this council?
AA: I think it's one of the most complicated questions. It is necessary to do something with council of citizen participation. When I was president of the constituent assembly, we discussed it and it was approved there. The people ratified it in the voting booths. However, we had some doubts as to whether it could be taken advantage of. We had doubts because there was the risk that powerful groups of Ecuadorian society, via foundations, for example, coopt the council of citizen participation. There were other risks, that the state itself might coopt it. This is what ended up happening. Correa became into a kind of King Louis XIV of the Andes and even got to the point where he said he is the state and the state is me and coopted the council of citizen participation.
So, if we want to give room to a process of de-Correa-ization of the state, for a process that allows us to eliminate those elements that consolidate and deepen the strong-man logic of Ecuadorian life, then we need to get rid of this council of citizen participation. This council of citizen participation is responsible, for example, for having named and maintained in office the comptroller general Carlos Polít, who as we know now, according to accusations from the attorney general's office, was a sort of great protector of out of control corruption in Correa-ism. So the problem is, how it will be changed. We will be handing over to President Moreno a lot of power. Too much power. He has an enormous responsibility because he can fall victim to temptation. If the people say yes [to the reform], he has the right to send his nominations to the National Assembly and put only people he trusts [in the council]. He would then be able to re-establish a stranglehold on all of the branches of the state, above all those such as the superintendency, the attorney general, procurator, the council of the judiciary. We would be transitioning from Correa-ism to Moreno-ism.
It is fundamental that we not only succeed in this question, but that the day after the vote we pressure Moreno so that he complies with his promise to not repeat these practices. In any case, the question is out there: what do with the council of citizen participation? The door is open to elect the members of this council in the year 2019 and this is the challenge: how to make sure that this council truly represents the forces of the citizenry and not those of the old party system or of the new party system, which is what we currently have with Alianza Pais [the governing party].
GW: Other important referendum questions have to do with the environment, such as the National Park Yasuni and the limiting of metal mining. What do you think of those questions?
AA: These are very timid questions. He did not have the political will to present the questions correctly. The elimination of mining: what is being asked, is already in the constitution and in the law. There is nothing new here. Of course, it's interesting that there is a massive popular support that says "no" to mining in very broad terms - not just in the terms that are being presented in the referendum question, but in very broad terms. I would say that this is just a ratification of a call from the citizenry, that there not be any mining in the country. And we have to continue to put pressure after Monday, February 5th. All that was necessary was for president Moreno to say, we will comply with the constitutional mandate of April 18, 2008, which prohibits mining near all waterways, in flood plains, near lakes, in mangroves, in beaches. This would have been fantastic.
In relation to the question about the Yasuni park, president Moreno did not have the courage to re-take the Yasuni ITT initiative. He could have done that, for many reasons. He could have been a great leader on an international level. We now know that this initiative was very big: a big initiative for a small president. Correa couldn't do it. He didn't live up to it. Moreno didn't even try. But in this question there are two things that need to be recovered. First, that it would increase the territory of the indigenous people. It recognizes the existence of this territory and the Ecuadorian people will ratify with their vote not only the existence, but also the expansion of this territory. It's only 50,000 hectares - it would have been better to expand it by 200,000 hectares, which could have covered the entire area [indigenous names].
We do not know exactly where they will go, but it's being discussed and that's positive. It's also interesting, but doesn't satisfy me completely, that the area is being reduced for oil exploration, from 1,030 hectares to 300 hectares. But I personally believe, via the studies that I've read, that they are exploiting more than 300 hectares. Nonetheless, it's necessary to put pressure after February 5th, that this becomes a reality: not one more oil well in Yasuni.
GW: The other big question has to do with reelection. Here we have principled arguments against indefinite reelection, but some say it's really designed to stop Correa, nothing more.
AA: To be honest, it seems to me that there is an interest to stop Correa's continued participation in political life. Moreno needs this in order to govern in peace. And there are groups that want this to happen. But there is also a very clear issue: indefinite reelection was abolished by the Constituent Assembly. In addition, in the constitutions of Ecuador - and we've had 21 - indefinite reelection has never existed.
In the constitution of 1879, which is considered to be a black letter, a constitution written by another conservative caudillo, Gabriel Garcia Moreno, there was an indefinite intermittent reelection. A person could be in office for two periods, had to leave for one period, and then could return for two more periods. This intermittency has always existed. However, Correa, running over the constitution of Monetcristi, introduced indefinite reelection. The constitution of Montecristi prohibits indefinite reelection for all positions of popular election - article 114 - such as for mayors, prefects, council members. They can only be reelected one single time, no more. And article 144 prohibits indefinite reelection of the president and the vice president of the republic. They can only be reelected one single time. And so you can see many articles that prohibit indefinite reelection. It talks about the alternatability or alternacy for political parties, for all social organizations, for councils of citizen equality, for the attorney general, for the procurator, for everything. The constitution talks about the need for a radical democracy where alternacy is one of its characteristics.
So now one political tendency can be reelected over and over again, that's correct. But this means that there has to a process of democratization within the parties, so there is not just one single leadership, one single caudillo, but different voices and persons and this will democratize the society from below. Correa did not respect this and in December of 2015, running over the constitution, without consulting the Ecuadorian people, introduced indefinite reelection. Now the Ecuadorian people has the opportunity to say whether it wants or does not want indefinite reelection.
GW: Finally, there's the question about taxing surplus profits.
AA: That law is very bad. The law is badly written, confusing, contradictory, and has terrible elements in it, such as one that eliminates taxes on mining companies for six years. We shouldn't forget that Correa was the biggest promoter of mega-mining, the biggest defender of mining interests, above all of the Chinese, and among others gave them these benefits. But despite all of this, it's the only question where I will vote "No." Because it seems to me very dangerous, very perverse, that with a popular consultation one can get rid of a tax, such as one on profits. I am in favor of taxing profits. It's a mechanism that helps to create great social equality. Those who have more must pay more taxes. This is good. Those who live of land speculation, must pay a tax.
In addition, I believe we must take into consideration that one cannot eliminate, via popular consultation, a tax. It's unconstitutional. We have already had an experience with this. What would happen if someone gets the idea to eliminate the income tax? This already happened once in Ecuador. In 1999 the current mayor of Guayaquil, was a deputy of the Social Christian Party, and he proposed and succeeded, with his thesis of eliminating the income tax and to instead introduce a tax on the circulation of capital, which exacerbated the economic crisis. It wasn't the cause of the economic crisis, but provoked an enormous problem and sharpened the crisis, which was very hard for Ecuador in 1999/2000. One cannot discard a tax simply with a popular consultation.
Source